Operation Jalisco

Operation Jalisco: The Rise of The Jalisco New Generation Cartel and Peña Nieto’s Militarised Security Strategy

Hannah Croft  

On 1 May 2015 the Mexican military announced ‘Operation Jalisco’, a full-spectrum security engagement to tackle violence and drug trafficking in Jalisco, a state in Western Mexico. Although there was no indication that the operation is targeted at any specific organised crime group, it has been made clear that resources will be concentrated on one particular drug trafficking organisation (DTO), the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación, or CJNG). As their name suggests, the CJNG operates primarily in Jalisco and its neighbouring states of Michoacán, Veracruz, Nayarit, and Colima. Since the start of Enrique Peña Nieto’s presidency in December 2012, the CJNG has experienced extraordinary growth in its size and financial power, and it is now regarded as the most powerful cartel in Mexico. After instigating relatively successful operations against other cartels in the region, particularly in the states of Michoacán and Sinaloa, President Peña Nieto has turned his attention to Jalisco in response to the CJNG’s recent acts of brutality against police and civilians. Although Operation Jalisco is still in its infancy, the time is ripe for strategic reassessment and a reflection on past policies as the government formulates its tactics to tackle narco-violence. This article will explore the growth of the CJNG and its tactical and strategic objectives before and after the announcement of Operation Jalisco, as well as the current challenges that the government faces, and what recommendations should be in place if it wants to successfully re-establish control in Jalisco.

The first section of this paper presents a brief overview of the strategic benefits that Jalisco offers to the government and to drug trafficking organisations, with particular emphasis on its commercial and geographical assets and how these have buttressed the growth of CJNG’s activities in the region. The second section will then present a deeper examination of CJNG’s activities, its narrative, and its relationship with the government and local police forces. It will then address the sudden shift in its strategy from 2015, when it began to directly confront local police forces in Jalisco, and consider how it will adapt to the recent military crackdown. The last section will examine the failings of Peña Nieto’s policy, in particular its preoccupation with the kingpin strategy, and instead recommend that a more systematic approach should be adopted if the government wants to see long-term improvements. This includes a renegotiation of the roles of police and military, anti-corruption efforts, assiduous intelligence collection, and a focus on mid-level gang member convictions.  . .

Source: https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/operation-jalisco-the-rise-of-the-jalisco-new-generation-cartel-and-peña-nieto’s-militarise